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STATEMENT OF SENATOR MAX BAUCUS
GRAINGROWERS CONVENTION -- GREAT FALLS
December 2, 1992
In 1841, Jesuit priests constructed St. Mary's Mission in western Montana. One of
Father De Smet's first acts was the purchase of seed for potatoes, wheat and oats from Fort
Colville.
The local Indians advised De Smet that the soil would not support crops. But one
crop thrived -- wheat. Within a few years, the Jesuits built a mill and were distributing flour
to the locals.
By the time of the Civil War in the 1860s, the territory of western Montana was
known for its wheat exports. The Gallatin Valley, for example, shipped its highly regarded
grain to Virginia City. In 1864, the Penwell Brothers reaped 3,600 bushels from their 75
acres of wheat. A 1867 survey reported 8,351 Montana acres sown in wheat and 1,971 acres
sown in oats and barley.
The drylands of Eastern Montana presented an even bigger challenge. It wasn't until
the passage of the Enlarged Homestead Act in 1909 that large numbers of farmers and
ranchers settled Montana's eastern plains.
Like today, the obstacles facing Montana's early farmers were enormous. New strains
of wheat, strip farming, specialized equipment and techniques for plowing -- all of these were
necessary to coax wheat from eastern Montana's stubborn soil.
But tenacity and sweat paid off. In 1899, Montana produced less than 2 million
bushels of wheat. By 1924, Montana produced 44 million bushels. By 1951, the total was
98 million.
In an excellent essay on the history of agriculture in Montana, Robert Dunbar wrote
that: "The story of agriculture in Montana is one of adaptation to an environment."
I can't think of a more important theme for my remarks today -- meeting the
challenges of a tough environment.
Today, Montana is a part of an international environment. Our ability to compete in
the 21st century -- our ability to continue the legacy of our forbearers -- will depend in large
part on our ability to compete in tough, international markets.
I want to address my remarks today to the topic of graingrowers and international
trade. In particular, I want to discuss the primary international challenges I see confronting
Montana graingrowers -- and how I intend to address them in Congress.
WHEAT AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
I don't need to tell you about the importance of international markets to American
agriculture - particularly wheat farmers. Wheat has become an export crop. In an average
year, two-thirds to three quarters of the American wheat crop is exported. In Montana,
between 70% and 90% of the wheat crop is exported -- usually to the Pacific Rim.
MULTILATERAL TRADE -- THE GATE
The laws governing international trade come from three primary sources. Unilateral
U.S. laws are those established by Congress without negotiating with other countries. An
example is Section 301, a measure I will discuss later.
Bilateral or trilateral agreements are treaties negotiated with other countries. The
U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement and the NAFTA are examples of this type of
arrangement. Multilateral agreements establish the broadest laws governing international
trade. The GAiT, or the "General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, is the primary
international organ for trade. Nearly 100 countries are members.
The GATT has been in the news a lot lately. For the last six years, GATT members
have been trying to negotiate a new set of rules governing trade. The negotiations are known
as the "Uruguay Round," named for the country where the talks were launched in 1986.
As most of you may know, agriculture is at the center of a dispute which has
deadlocked the Uruguay Round. The dispute boils down to this -- the U.S. can no longer
tolerate the European Community's trade distorting system of agricultural subsidies.
The EC maintains the most heavily subsidized agricultural industry in the developed
world. For example, the EC spends about $11 billion every year just subsidizing agricultural
exports -- for comparison, the U.S. spends just over $1 billion on export subsidies through the
Export Enhancement Program -- EEP.
The effect of these subsidies is lost sales and depressed prices for U.S. farmers. EC
wheat export subsidies have cost the U.S. markets in Eastern Europe and Asia.
Let me give you an example out of today's headlines that demonstrates the problem in
a nutshell. Oilseeds have been all over the papers and evening news in the past few weeks.
There's even been talk of a "trade war" between the United States and Europe.
The genesis of this dispute goes back to 1962. In that year, the EC agreed to
eliminate trade barriers against U.S. soybean exports. This created a great opportunity for
U.S. farmers, who suddenly had duty-free access to a market of 300 million people. At this
time, the EC provided no subsidy for soybeans or other oilseeds and produced virtually none.
Unfortunately, the EC in the early 1980s decided to cut soybean imports by
dramatically increasing its oilseed production subsidies. Not surprisingly, European farmers
moved to take advantage of the suddenly lucrative oilseed business.
U.S. farmers paid the price. Unable to compete against subsidized oilseeds, we lost at
least $1 billion a year in soybean sales.
In response to this situation, U.S. soybean farmers in 1987 convinced the Reagan
Administration to "sue" the EC through the GATT. In 1989, an international dispute
settlement panel determined that the U.S. was in the right - the EC oilseed subsidies violated
the 1962 promise not to block soybean imports. The EC was ordered to end its oilseed
subsidies by 1991.
The EC's solution was to create a new system that still guaranteed EC farmers two
times the world oilseed price.
Once again, the U.S. "sued" through the GATT. Once again, an international panel
determined that the EC was wrong. And once again, the GATT ordered the EC to reform its
subsidy regime.
To make a long story short, a last minute, inadequate deal was struck to resolve the
issue. The U.S. ended up signing onto an agreement with the EC to resolve the dispute that
allowed the EC to still produce 9.5 million metric tons of subsidized oilseeds -- even though
the GATT had twice ruled that producing any subsidized oilseeds violated a previous
agreement.
- I know that you are not oilseed farmers. But I think the oilseed saga goes a long way
towards describing the problems we have had with agriculture generally. A pattern
isemerging. The U.S. seeks to put limits on subsidies and free up trade, the EC rejects the
proposal, and the U.S. caves in -- settling for a very modest deal so as not to endanger the
overall relationship or risk trade retaliation.
Already, the U.S. has agreed in principle with the EC to a GAIT package that would
make only very modest cuts in EC export subsidies -- on the order of 21%. This is after the
U.S. for six years fought for first a 100% and then a 90% reduction. In the end, the U.S. got
only one-fifth of what it wanted, the EC got four-fifths of what it wanted. Not much of a
compromise.
There are those who say that the U.S. should back off on agriculture -- that we're
jeopardizing potential gains for manufactured goods or the service sector.
There are also those who say we should be satisfied with a very modest limit on EC
agricultural subsidies arguing that we have little bargaining leverage since we cut our own
farm program voluntarily in 1990.
I don't agree. I hope that the EC will come around and make a real, meaningful
GATT deal possible. The potential benefits for the U.S. economy are great. But an
agreement should not come at agriculture's expense. We started these negotiations with the
goal of winning meaningful cuts in EC subsidies, we should not give up until we achieve that
goal. I am a firm believer that no agreement is better than a bad agreement.
In the upcoming months, I'll be working to make sure that no bad deal is not passed
off on American farmers.
BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
In short, the prospects of the GATT - that is, a broad multilateral approach to opening
new markets -- are very much up in the air at this point
Over the past several years, the U.S. has begun to explore other mechanisms for
promoting trade. One mechanism that has been explored is the bilateral or trilateral
agreement.
One advantage of these arrangements is that they involve fewer parties, and therefore
are less cumbersome to negotiate. Unlike the GATT, there's less problem with "too many
cooks spoiling the broth." At the same time, bilaterals offer an opportunity to lower trade
barriers.
I know there's a lot of skepticism about both the bilateral agreement the U.S.
negotiated with Canada -- the so called U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, and about the
new proposals for a NAFTA -- or North American Free Trade Agreement. I think that
skepticism is justified.
Anyone who believes we have established true free trade with Canada should take a
hard look at the situation faced by American wheat farmers.
First, Canada continues to provide export subsidies on all wheat exports to the U.S.
The Canada Free Trade Agreement includes a general prohibition on employing export
subsides on shipments to the other party. But Canada is granted a special exemption from
this provision for certain transportation subsidies -- known as "Crow's Nest" subsidies. Not
surprisingly, Canadian wheat exports to the U.S. have risen dramatically and are expected to
hit 42 million bushels next year.
Second, all sales of Canadian wheat are still handled by a government chartered
monopoly known as the Canadian Wheat Board. The price that this board charges for export
sales of wheat is generally much lower than the domestic price for the same wheat. This
practice is generally known as dumping and is prohibited by U.S. and international law.
The U.S. recently instituted dispute settlement proceedings against Canada related to
durum wheat on the pricing practices of the Canadian Wheat Board. But these proceedings
are slow and narrowly targeted. In the meantime, U.S. farmers continue to shoulder the
burden.
Canada's cutthroat pricing policies translate into lost sales for you. In Mexico last
year, Canada captured some 76% of the market while the Bush Administration sat on its
hands.
A third problem with Canada concerns end-use certificates. Canada is permitted to
use end-use certificates on grain imported into Canada. These certificates are required to
ensure that imported grain is not commingled with Canadian grain.
American wheat farmers have been pushing for similar end-use certificates on imports
of wheat. There is a particular concern that Canadian wheat will be mixed into American
shipments exported under farm export programs.
Incredibly, the Bush Administration told wheat farmers that any use of U.S. end-use
certificates would violate the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement. Apparently, the U.S. and
Canada are living by different sets of rules.
Canada may be a good trading partner in some sectors. And the U.S.-Canada Trade
Agreement has been good for many American businessmen. But with regard to wheat,
Canadian practices put Japan to shame.
To make the matter even more frustrating, the Bush Administration held out the
negotiations over the NAFTA as a means for addressing the shortcomings of the U.S.-Canada
Free Trade Agreement to convince wheat growers to support their request to extend fast track
negotiating authority.
Then, in the final days of the negotiations, Canada chose essentially to remove the
entire topic of agriculture from the NAFTA negotiations. The u.S. caved in.
In short, we are left in an extremely unsatisfactory position. The question is, what do
we do about it?
UNILATERAL U.S. TRADE LAWS
This brings us to the third category of trade law -- unilateral U.S. laws. Up until now,
I have discussed two categories of trade laws -- multilateral laws through the GATT, and
bilateral or trilateral trade arrangements such as the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement.
But we have another arrow in our quiver -- unilateral U.S. trade laws. We've tried
other solutions. Now it's time for the U.S. to take matters into its own hands with regard to
Canadian wheat.
I will seek three actions in the new Congress to address unfair Canadian trading
practices:
First, I will seek to require end-use certificates on wheat imports from Canada. If
Canada can employ such certificates, the U.S. can too. What's good for the goose is good for
the gander.
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Second, I will seek to initiate trade dispute settlement procedures to end unfair pricing
practices by the Canadian Wheat Board. If unfair pricing continues, I will press for the use
of existing U.S. laws to halt the practice.
Third, I will seek a commitment from the new Clinton Administration to use the
Export Enhancement Program to counter Canadian subsidies on wheat shipments to Mexico.
There is no market reason for Canada to control 76% of Mexico's growing market.
These steps are not a cure-all for our problems with Canada. But I think they will
send an important message: Americans will no longer take Canadian cheating sitting down.
CHINA MFN
There's one final international trade topic that I know is of primary interest to
Montana graingrowers -- China. For the past three years, Congress has engaged in an
emotional debate over whether the U.S. should grant China most favored nation trading status
-- MFN.
I am strongly opposed to efforts to revoke or condition China's MFN. I have been
extremely active in the past three years in working to formulate alternative measures for
addressing our concerns with China.
But don't get me wrong, I have a lot of concerns with China. No one with a
television can forget the images of the June 1989 massacre in Tiananmen Square. We all
worry about reports that China is assisting unstable Middle Eastern regimes gain nuclear
technology. We all are outraged about a Chinese wall of barriers that blocks access to many
U.S. goods.
But in my mind, the China debate is not a question of whether we have big problems
with China. We do. Rather, the China debate is a question of how best we address our
problems with China.
I think MFN is the wrong tool for the job. Although "most favored nation" status
sounds like a preferential arrangement, MFN is actually the normal trade status that the U.S.
gives to almost every nation in the world. You might be surprised to learn that we give MFN
to Libya, Syria, and believe it or not --Iraq.
Because China is a communist country, its MFN status must be renewed on an annual
basis. As a result, the MFN issue presents itself each year as an obvious target for those who
are angry with China.
I oppose restrictions on MFN for three reasons.
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First, I am strongly opposed to unilateral trade embargoes. We tried that once before
with the Soviet grain embargo. I think you all know how that worked out. The Soviets'
behavior did not change. They bought all the grain they needed from the Australians and the
Canadians. American farmers were the only ones truly hurt.
The U.S. is the only country even thinking about restricting MFN. If we take such
action, no other country is even contemplating following the U.S. lead. Not Japan, Not
Canada, Not Australia, not the EC -- No one.
I believe there is little doubt that if the U.S. cut off MFN, China would retaliate
against U.S. exports. Historically, one of the biggest U.S. exports to China is wheat. U.S.
wheat would therefore be a likely target for retaliatory Chinese trade actions. So would U.S.
aircraft, fertilizer, and automobile exports.
My second reason for opposing new MFN conditions for China is that I believe trade
itself promotes reform in China. In the past fifty years, China's most repressive periods have
occurred when China was isolated from the rest of the world.
Conversely, the most progressive regions of China are those that trade the most with
the west. That's no accident. Ideas are traded along with goods. Our presence in China has
an enormously positive influence -- one that would be lost if we cut off trade with China.
Finally, I oppose restricting China's MFN because the U.S. has other, more effective
tools at its disposal. If restricting MFN were absolutely the only way to address our concerns
with China, I might support such action.
But it's not. In the past two years, I have advocated what I call a "smart weapons"
approach to China. Rather than blanket restrictions on MFN, I have urged the Bush
Administration to use carefully targeted tools to address specific concerns with China.
We have achieved important results. We have used our trade laws to negotiate an
agreement to protect U.S. intellectual property and a broad agreement on market access. We
successfully pushed China to sign the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty. We got an agreement
cracking down on China's exports of goods produced by prison labor.
A lot remains to be done. And I will continue to work hard for targeted measures
addressing our concerns with China. But I also will work hard against blanket efforts to
restrict MFN.
Many of you may be wondering what a Clinton presidency will mean for MFN. You
should know that I will be working hard to influence his thinking on this issue. In the end, I
believe President Clinton will be a pragmatic leader on international issues.
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Your organization has an important role to play. In the past, state and national
representatives of graingrowers have been among the most effective advocates of maintaining
MFN. MFN is likely to see another round of debate this year. You need to make sure you
voices are heard. I will be working as your strong ally in Washington.
CONCLUSION
I hope my remarks today have underscored the importance of international trade issues
to Montana graingrowers.
A hundred years ago, Montana was the new frontier. Through hard work, innovative
techniques, and sheer determination -- our forefathers adapted to this environment and turned
Montana into the nation's breadbasket.
Today, the new frontier is international. Our challenge is to carry on the successful
legacy of our ancestors -- to prosper in face of tough competition.
On a level playing field, I have no concerns about beating the international
competition. I am confident that Montana grows the best grain in the world. That's your
job. My job is to make sure that the playing field is level. I'll be working hard on that front.
Together, we can keep agriculture's historic place in Montana's economy.
